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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS),
a construction for remote data storage that provides access-pattern
obfuscation in a honest-but-curious adversarial model, while allo-
wing for low bandwidth overhead and client storage. Compared to
other approaches, the main advantage of CAOS is that it supports
concurrent access without a proxy, for multiple read-only clients
and a single read-write client. Concurrent access is achieved by
letting clients maintain independent maps that describe how the
data is stored. Even though the maps might diverge from client to
client, the protocol guarantees that clients will always have access
to the data. Efficiency and concurrency are achieved at the expense
of perfect obfuscation: in CAOS the extent to which access patterns
are hidden is determined by the resources allocated to its built-in
obfuscation mechanism. To assess this trade-off we provide both
a security and a performance analysis of CAOS. We additionally
provide a proof-of-concept implementation1.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Management and querying of en-
crypted data; File system security;
KEYWORDS
data obfuscation; concurrent-access obfuscated store; access pattern
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has become an attractive solution for data storage.
Unfortunately, current cloud computing architectures do not pro-
vide sufficient and reliable security for private and sensitive data.
Even when encryption is used, malicious servers and operators
can learn user access patterns and derive information based on
them (e.g., data accessed more often can be assumed to be more
important) [7].
One cryptographic primitive specifically designed to hide access
patterns is Oblivious RAM (ORAM). This primitive was introduced
by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [12, 13] for the purposes of preventing
software reverse engineering by hiding a program’s access patterns
to memory. The issue has since become important in the context of
cloud computing, where clients and data-store servers often reside
in different trust domains and trust between them cannot always
be established. Modern ORAM schemes [10, 16, 22] are seen as
viable options of addressing this problem. However, in real-life
scenarios, even the best ORAMs can prove to be impractical [15],
mainly because of the high bandwidth requirements and/or client
storage constraints. Another major limitation of modern ORAM
constructions is that they are mainly restricted to having a single-
client that connects to the data-store server. This is because data
1Available: https://github.com/meehien/caos
in the store is accessed through a client maintained local structure
(i.e. a map). Migrating from this model has proven difficult. Even
small deviations [20, 23], such as allowing multiple clients to access
the store through a proxy that acts as the single-client have been
shown to have vulnerabilities [17].
As ORAMs have been difficult to use in real-life, other specia-
lised, and more efficient security primitives have been developed
in the context of privacy preserving access to cloud-stored data
e.g. searchable encryption (SE) schemes. SE uses either symmetric
keys [8, 9, 18] or public keys [19] and allows clients to securely
search cloud stored databases through precomputed ciphertexts
called trapdoors. SE schemes have low computational requirements
from clients and are bandwidth efficient. However, prior work has
shown that searchable encryption schemes leak significant amounts
of information about their encrypted indexes when using attacks
which combine access-pattern analysis, background information
about data stored, and language-based word frequency knowledge
[14]. Incorporating changes and updates to the searched database
is also a difficult process. Often schemes require the whole index
to be regenerated for any the new information added [8, 9]. Finally,
SE schemes are restricted to search operations, actual data retrieval
needs to happen through a private information retrieval protocol
[6] or an ORAM.
As such, an ideal system would have the general applicability
and access-pattern privacy of ORAM (cloud storage which hides
access patterns), and bandwidth efficiency and concurrent access ca-
pabilities similar to those of SE schemes. In this paper we take steps
towards this direction by proposing a new design for a general-
purposed secure storage with concurrency and bandwidth effi-
ciency. However, the privacy guarantees we provide are not abso-
lute. Instead, our protocol requires that users provision resources
for access-pattern obfuscation, and the security guarantees depend
on how much of these resources are available.
1.1 Contributions
This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS),
a storage access protocol that can hide data access frequency and
access patterns, while allowing for concurrent data access. Our
main focus when designing CAOS is to obtain a bandwidth-efficient
protocol that supports concurrency by design and that is able to
provide a customizable amount of data and access-pattern privacy.
Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) Obfuscated access patterns.We propose a secure access
protocol for remote data storage which is able to hide access
patterns. Our construction requires at least one of each of
the following two types of clients: a regular client which
stores data, and an obfuscation client which hides client’s
access patterns. Maximum privacy is achieved as long as at
least one obfuscation client behaves honestly.
(2) Concurrent access.We provide, to our knowledge, the first
concurrent-access protocol with access-pattern hiding pro-
perties that does not require a trusted third party (e.g. proxy).
Our concurrent access protocol is applicable in scenarios
with multiple readers, but can cope with having a single
writer.
(3) Small and constant bandwidth. For all clients with read-
write/read-only access, our protocol requires a constant
bandwidth that is independent of the size of the store. This is
possible because we separate the regular access clients and
the security responsible clients (i.e. the obfuscation clients).
The bandwidth requirements for interacting with the store
are also small. In our current instantiation a single block of
data requires a constant two blocks to be transferred.
(4) Security andperformance analysis.Wegive a game-based
definition of data and access-pattern privacy for CAOS-like
protocols against honest-but-curious storage servers. Furt-
hermore, we apply this new definition to CAOS and prove
it secure. Last but not least we report on the theoretical
and observed performance of our protocol thanks to our
proof-of-concept implementation.
2 CONCURRENT-ACCESS OBFUSCATED
STORE (CAOS)
CAOS is a protocol for storing data securely by encrypting it and
anonymizing (read or write) access patterns. CAOS allows users to
trade storage space and security for concurrency and bandwidth
efficiency.
Data elements. In CAOS data is partitioned into blocks of equal size.
Each block of data is uniquely identified by a client using a block
id (bid). Storing a block remotely involves encrypting the contents
of the block and then placing the resulting ciphertext at a random
location in the store’s memory. We refer to these locations at the
store’s memory as positions. The size of the store is measured in
the number of positions it has available for storing blocks. Clients
can store the same block at multiple positions and keep track of
where their data is located by maintaining a map which links block
ids to positions.
Clients. There are two types of clients in CAOS: regular clients
(RC), which may be read-write (RW) or read-only (RO); and obfus-
cation clients (OC). Both RC and OC access the store directly and
independently from each other.
Regular clients are the main users of the store. They have low
bandwidth and local storage requirements, as they only have to
store a map. However, accesses done by these clients do leak infor-
mation about access patterns. Obfuscation clients are the clients that
provide security. These clients are able to provide access-pattern
obfuscation for themselves as well as RCs. For that purpose OCs
use of a buffer which is stored locally in addition to a map. The size
of the OC’s local buffer and the OC’s bandwidth requirements are
proportional to the speed of obfuscation.
Access-pattern obfuscation. Our definitions derive from existing
access-pattern security definitions in ORAM [21]. Intuitively, the
ORAM definitions require that no information should leak with
regards to: (1) which data is being accessed, (2) the frequency of
accesses, (3) the relation between accesses, (4) whether access is read
or write, and (5) the age of the data. ORAM constructions maintain
invariants to ensure that no information is leaked regardless of how
many times the store is accessed. CAOS maintains the requirement
that no information is leaked for cases (1)-(5), but does not provide
guarantees for each individual access operation. Instead, CAOS
provides security guarantees for access sequences that involve both
regular clients and obfuscation clients. Our security definitions
for content and access-pattern security in CAOS are detailed in
Section 5.
Concurrency. CAOS allows multiple clients to access the store si-
multaneously and independently from each other. Achieving con-
currency in CAOS is not a trivial task. This is because each client’s
access operation randomly changes the contents of store, and these
changes are only stored locally to that client. Thus, CAOS needs
to address two problems: (1) to synchronise locally stored client
maps in an efficient manner, and (2) how to allow multiple clients to
change the store simultaneously and in a way that does not result
in data loss for other clients.
Syntax. In the following we draw on the above and give the syntax
of our CAOS protocol. Alternative variants of CAOS are possible if
adhering to this syntax. We say that an (n,N ) store S is a collection
of n data blocks written to N store positions such that n < N .
Definition 2.1. CAOS consists of a tuple of five PT algorithmsO =
(KGen, INIT.STORE, INIT.OC,ACCESSRW,ACCESSOC) over an
(n,N ) store S :
k ← KGen(1λ) : is a setup probabilistic algorithm run by the RW
client. It takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs
a secret key k .
S ← INIT.STORE(DB,N ,k) : is a deterministic algorithm run by
the RW client to initialize the data store. It takes as input
a database DB = (B0, . . . ,Bn−1) of n data blocks, encrypts
each block under key k , and distributes them between the
total number N of store positions.
buf, S ← INIT.OC(S,k) : is a deterministic algorithm run by the
OC to initialize itself. It requires access to an initialized store
S and its encryption key k and creates the internal buffer of
the obfuscation client.
ret, S ← ACCESSRW(B,op,d, S,k) : is a probabilistic algorithm that
RCs run to access a store. It takes as input the bid B to be
accessed, the operation op ∈ {read,write}, the data d to be
written if op = write , and the store S and its key k . When
the client runs this algorithm, some positions on the server
are read, and others are written. It returns the block read or
an acknowledgement for the write operation, and the new
state of the store S .
buf, S ← ACCESSOC(buf, S,k) : is a probabilistic algorithm run
by the OC to access a store. It takes as input a local data
structure buf that acts as a buffer, a store S and a key k . The
algorithm alters the OC’s buffer of the obfuscation client.
Additionally, when the obfuscation client runs this algorithm,
some positions in the store are read, while others are written.
This changes the mapping between blocks and positions.
Store block1 block2 block1 . . . blockn
p1 p2 p3 pN
Block bid cns ts data
Figure 1a: Server data structures in CAOS. The server redundantly
stores n equally-sized encrypted blocks at N memory locations,
n < N . The memory locations are addressable through unique po-
sitions ids p1, . . . , pN . Each block stored contains the data inten-
ded for storage (i.e. block .data) and a small amount of metadata
(i.e. block .bid , block .ts and block .cns ) that helps with map syn-
chronization between concurrent clients.
Map bid1 bid2 . . . bidn
BlockID psns ts vf
pa pb . . .
Positions
px . . .
Verified positions
Figure 1b: Client local data structures in CAOS. The client stores
a linear map indexed by block ids (i.e. bid ). For block id bid the
client stores a list of server positions (i.e. bid .psns ) fromwhere the
block can be retrieved. The map also keeps some metadata about
each block id (i.e. bid .ts and bid .vf) that helps with synchronisa-
tion between concurrent clients.
3 EFFICIENT ACCESS-PATTERN
OBFUSCATION IN CAOS
This section describes CAOS. We begin with an overview of the
protocol and we will follow up with details about the corresponding
algorithms and discussing a proof of concept implementation. The
complete source-code is available at [1].
3.1 Overview
Access pattern obfuscation. In CAOS we achieve access-pattern
obfuscation for sequences of access operations (see Section 5).
This is a weaker security guarantee than that used in other works
[12, 13, 21], where obfuscation is achieved for each single access
operation. In return, our construction allows for concurrency and
is more practical.
In CAOS hiding the type of access (read or write) and the age
of the data is done by joining both the read and the write operati-
ons into a single access function, ACCESSRW. This prevents the
adversary from learning when data is read or written, and when
new data is added to the store, with the exception of the initial
provisioning of the store done by running INIT.STORE.
CAOS uses a locally storedmap per client to keep track of which
store positions contain which blocks. By setting the size of the store
to be larger than the size of the data to be secured, the algorithm
ACCESSRW can create redundancies through re-encrypting and
duplicating blocks from the store and assign them to random free-
positions. We use the term free-positions to refer both to store
positions which have never been written, and to positions whose
corresponding blocks have at least one redundancy (i.e. blocks
that are stored in two or more places). By allowing regular clients
(RCs) to access the same data from multiple store positions we are
able to partially obfuscate details about the frequency with which
specific data is being accessed, and about the relationship between
subsequent accesses. We say partially because, even though data is
duplicated to randompositions, the adversary can still connect these
positions to the initial position from where the duplication process
began. To address this issue we use obfuscation clients (OCs). These
are read-only clients that use the ACCESSOC function to access
the store similarly to RCs. The difference is that OCs maintain a
local buffer which is used to store the contents of the positions
received from the store. When an OC performs a store access, it
writes (i.e. duplicates) in the store a block read from its buffer. As
such, blocks that are duplicated by OCs are not linked to current
store blocks and do not leak any access-pattern information.
Data structures. In CAOS each store block contains the following:
data to be stored block.data, a block identifier block.bid, a consolida-
tion field block.cns that indicates the number of clients that know
that a block is stored at a position, and a timestamp block.ts of when
the data was last changed (cf. Fig 1a).
Client local maps are indexed by the block identifier bid, and
contain the following: bid.psns enumerates the positions in the store
from which the block bid is available, bid.ts stores most up-to-date
timestamp observed, and bid.vf stores positions p observed by the
map holder (i.e. client) to have block.cns=|Clients |, where Clients
is the set of all clients engaged in our protocol (cf. Fig 1b).
Concurrency. In CAOS access-pattern obfuscation is achieved through
shuffling, thus achieving efficient concurrency with direct access
for all clients represents a significant challenge. This is especially
difficult because in CAOS each client maintains its own map and
syncs it with the store independently from other clients during
ACCESSRW or ACCESSOC operations. In order to prevent data
loss, i.e. that a client looses track of the current data in the store,
we ensure that “for each data block, there exists a valid position
that is known to all clients”. Maintaining this invariant has lead to
two design constraints: (1) we require that for each single block
accessed two positions are read and two positions are written on
the server store, and (2) CAOS can only handle a single read-write
client that works concurrently with other read-only and/or obfus-
cation clients. These restrictions are further discussed in Section
5.2.
Shared knowledge between clients is tracked using block.cns and
bid.vf. All clients start from the same version of the map, which is
afterwards maintained independently by each one. The protocol
requires clients to signal each other when they perform changes to
their local maps (i.e. when reassigning a position or when changing
the data in a block). Because the client only has access to one
position per block during an access operation, the change produced
by the client will be localised to that particular position in the store.
The problem is that without any additional signalling other clients
Select
Position
Sync Prepare
Write
Duplicate
Block
ACCESSRW
Figure 2: Client read-write access function. The function
ACCESSRW performs four actions: (1) selects the position used to
retrieve a block from the store, (2) synchronises local map with
metadata from retrieved blocks, (3) prepares a block to be written
back by ensuring that the write operation is possible, and (4)
attempts to duplicate one of the retrieved blocks onto the position
of the other.
who are not aware of the change have no way of assessing whether
the block stored at a specific position is the correct one (as indicated
by their map).
We indicate shared knowledge about a position as follows. Whe-
never a client makes a change to a block, the value block.cns is set
to 1, meaning that only one client, the one that made the change
is currently aware of the change. When other clients access this
block they can become aware that a reassignment has taken place
by comparing the block.bid value stored in the block with the value
they were expecting according to their local map. If the values do
not match the client will infer that the position used to retrieve
the block has been reassigned, and will update their local map ac-
cordingly. Similarly, by comparing timestamp data from the local
map map[bid].ts and from the retrieved block block.ts clients can
determine if the block’s data was updated.
Once a client becomes aware that a block has been reassigned
to a new position p (and has performed changes in its local map)
it increments block.cns by 1 to signal clients that it is aware of the
change. When the block.cns value is equal to the number of clients
then all the clients can safely assume they have the same view
about what block is stored at position p.
Next we continue by specifying CAOS algorithms.
3.2 Read-write (and read-only) client access
Read-write (RW) clients, such as email SMTP servers, and read-only
(RO) clients, such as email readers, perform reading and writing
through the function ACCESSRW (cf. Fig 2). We introduce the main
function first with calls to several sub-functions that implement
required functionality. Each sub-function is subsequently described.
The main ACCESSRW function detailed in Algorithm 1 involves
the following 8 main steps:
(1) Select positions (line 2,3). First, select a position (line 2) to
read/write a block as indicated by the input value bid . Then
select a random position to sync to the local map (line 3). The
block requested via bid will also be copied to the random
position if necessary conditions are met (see Algorithm 5).
The SelectPosition() function interacts with the locally sto-
red map data structure and selects a random position for a
given block id bid . If no bid is supplied a completely random
position is chosen from the set of known store positions.
(2) Read positions from store (line 4). Retrieve the block indica-
ted by bid and the random block using previously selected
positions and decrypt them.
Algorithm 1:Main CAOS access function.
Input: block id, operation, data (for write operation), store, client
mapc , store key
Output: data (for read operation), store, clientmapc
1 function ACCESSRW (bid, op, data, S,mapc , k)
2 r eq_p ← SelectPosit ion(bid ,mapc );
3 cpy_p ← SelectPosit ion(null ,mapc );
4 (r eq_blk , cpy_blk ) ← READ(r eq_p, cpy_p, S , k );
5 (r eq_blk ,mapc ) ← Sync(r eq_blk , r eq_p,mapc );
6 (cpy_blk ,mapc ) ← Sync(cpy_blk , cpy_p,mapc );
7 if (op = READ) then
8 if (r eq_blk .bid = bid ) then
9 out ← r eq_blk .data;
10 if (op =WRIT E) then
11 (r eq_blk , out ) ←
PrepareW rite(bid , r eq_blk , data);
12 (cpy_blk ,mapc ) ←
DuplicateBlock (r eq_blk , cpy_blk , cpy_p,mapc );
13 S ←WRITE(S , k , r eq_blk , cpy_blk , r eq_p, cpy_p);
14 return (out , S ,mapc );
(3) Sync (lines 5,6). Synchronize the metadata from the blocks
retrieved with the local client map.
(4) Return read data (lines 7-9). Prepare to return data if the
operation is READ and the block retrieved is correct. If the
block retrieved has a different bid than the one requested the
client has to re-run ACCESSRW. The protocol guarantees
that every client has a valid position for every block.
(5) Replace block data (lines 10,11). If the operation isWRITE
replace the current data in req_blk with the input data data.
(6) Duplicate block (line 12). Attempt to shuffle store data by
coping the req_blk to position cpy_p, thus increasing the
number of positions for req_blk and reducing the available
positions for block cpy_blk (see Algorithm 5).
(7) Write blocks to store (line 13). Encrypt req_blk and cpy_blk
and write them at positions req_p and cpy_p.
(8) Return (line 14). Return out as requested data if op = READ
and operation was successful; return null otherwise. Return
input data as out if op =WRITE and operation was success-
ful (null otherwise).
3.2.1 Sync function. This function (see Algorithm 2) enables
CAOS clients to work concurrently, without having to synchronize
their maps to access the store. We do require that once, during
the setup phase, clients share the store key and a map from one of
the other participating clients. Once a copy of the map has been
obtained each client can maintain its own version of the map i.e.
mapc .
Intuitively this works as follows: after a block has been retrieved
from the store, the client needs to establish if local knowledge about
the block is correct, i.e. bid of the retrieved block and the position
used to retrieve it are correctly linked, and the time-stamp of the
block is not older than the time-stamp stored locally. As such, the
Algorithm 2: Sync metadata between a store block and
the local map.
Input: block, position, client map
Output: block, client map
1 function Sync (block, p,mapc )
2 if (block .ts < mapc [block .bid ].ts) then
3 remove p frommapc [block .bid ].psns and
mapc [block .bid ].v f ;
4 block .bid ← f r ee ;
5 block .ts ← current_t ime ;
6 block .cns ← 1;
7 else
8 if (block .cns < |clients |) then
9 if (block .ts > mapc [block .bid ].ts) then
10 clearmapc [block .bid ].psns and
mapc [block .bid ].v f ;
11 setmapc [block .bid ].ts to current_t ime ;
12 if (p <mapc [block .bid ].psns) then
13 move p tomapc [block .bid ].psns ;
14 block .cns ← block .cns + 1;
15 if (block .cns = |clients |) then
16 add p tomapc [block .bid ].v f ;
17 return (block,mapc );
block can be in multiple states of which only the following require
a map modification: (1) old data – the block is marked as free; (2)
wrong position, data up-to-date – update bid/position association;
(3) new data – update bid/position association and local time-stamp.
Old data in a block is detected by comparing the block .ts value
with the locally storedmapc [block .bid].ts value, where block .bid
is the bid of the block being synchronised. Old data is thus easy
to detect as each bid entry from the map has a single time-stamp
(i.e.mapc [block .bid].ts): the newest time-stamp observed over all
store accesses. In this case the position used to retrieve the block
can be used for writing or duplication. If new data is detected,
the local time-stamp is updated and positions pointing to the old
version of the block are removed frommapc [block .bid].psns and
mapc [block .bid].vf. They can now be reused for writing or dupli-
cation.
If a wrong position is detected thenmapc is updated with cor-
rect bid-position association (the position thought to point to the
requested bid is moved to the correctmapc [block .bid].psns). Any
modification to a client’s local map is communicated to other by
incrementing block .cns .
3.2.2 PrepareWrite function. Writing or retrieving a block to/from
the store is not guaranteed to succeed. The PrepareWrite function
ensures that all necessary conditions are met before overwriting
the data of a block. A block can only be replaced if the id of the
block requested matches the id of the block fetched.
In the event that the block fetched is different than the block
requested data can still be replaced but only if the data in the fetched
block was old. Replacement of data inside the block is indicated
to other clients by resetting the block.cns value to 1 (i.e. only the
Select
Position
Sync Update
Buffer
Duplicate
Block
ACCESSOC
Figure 3: ACCESSOC performs three actions: (1) selects and retrie-
ves two blocks from the store, (2) synchronizes local map with me-
tadata from retrieved blocks, and (3) attempts to replace retrieved
blocks with buffered stored blocks.
current client knows about it) and updating the block.ts to current
epoch time. We give the pseudo-code for this function in Appendix
E, while Algorithm 4 presents the PrepareWrite function in detail.
3.2.3 DuplicateBlock. As previously mentioned, data shuffling
is performed through duplication, with two purposes: (1) increasing
the number of available positions for blocks accessed more often;
(2) reducing the available positions for the less accessed blocks.
The DuplicateBlock operation performs the necessary checks
and attempts to reassign positions from one block to another while
ensuring that clients still have at least one position for each block.
The difficulty of this operation resides in the fact that each client has
a slightly different version of the map and can only become aware
of changes after they have happened (often with significant delay).
In order to allow clients to attain a shared view about a position we
require that positions do not get reassigned while their block.cns
value is below themaximumnumber of clients. The single exception
to this rule is when a client has reassigned a position, decides to
reassign it again and no other client has noticed the reassignment.
This is allowed because it will not affect the convergence time for
that position. The specifics are presented in Appendix E, Algorithm
5.
3.3 Obfuscation client access
In CAOS data shuffling is performed on a single position at a
time. This process leaks a lot of information to the store server
because every run of the ACCESSRW function links two positi-
ons together with high probability (i.e. ideally, we require that the
DuplicateBlock function is successful every time).
To mitigate this we use a separate obfuscation client function
ACCESSOC as presented in Algorithm 3. This function is identical
to the ACCESSRW function as far as the interaction with the store
is concerned: two blocks are read from two server positions and
two blocks are written to the same positions.
The purpose of the OC is to prevent the store from linking the
positions that are duplicated thorough the regular ACCESSRW
function. This is done through the use of an OC locally stored
buffer. ACCESSOC places the blocks read from the store into its
buffer, while blocks chosen at random from those currently stored
in the buffer are written back to store. The replacement procedure
is bound to the same constraints as when blocks are duplicated by
regular clients, so we use the same DuplicateBlock functionality
to ensure these are enforced. A detailed version of our method is
presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Obfuscation client main access function.
Input: local buffer, obfuscation client map, store, key
Output: store, obfuscation client map
1 function ACCESSOC (buf, S,mapoc , k)
2 p1 ← SelectPosit ion(null ,mapoc );
3 p2 ← SelectPosit ion(null ,mapoc );
4 (blk1, blk2) ← READ(p1, p2, S , k );
5 (blk1,mapoc ) ← Sync(blk1, p1,mapoc );
6 (blk2,mapoc ) ← Sync(blk2, p2,mapoc );
7 (blk1, buf ) ← UpdateBuffer(blk1, p1, buf );
8 (blk2, buf ) ← UpdateBuffer(blk2, p2, buf );
9 S ←WRITE(S , k , blk1, blk2, p1, p2);
10 return (S,mapoc );
4 CONCURRENCY AND PARALLEL ACCESS
IN CAOS
In CAOS concurrency is supported by design. Regular clients com-
municate with the store using two messages that are abstracted
here as follows: READ(p1,p2) and WRITE(p1,p2). The message
READ(p1,p2) is used to request the two blocks located at positions
p1 and p2 in the store. Upon receiving this message the server will
lock p1 and p2 and will return the corresponding blocks to the client.
The client will process the data, and will use the blocks metadata
to update its local map (cf. Section 3). While the client processes
the contents of the blocks the server will keep p1 and p2 locked.
The positions p1 and p2 are unlocked when the server receives a
WRITE(p1,p2) message from the client that locked the positions.
In the event the client is unable to send aWRITE(p1,p2) message a
timeout period is used to unlock them.
Recall that the client is interested in retrieving the content of
only one of the positions, say p1, where p1 is chosen randomly from
the set of positions associated to a given block id in the client’s local
map. The other position p2 is chosen from the store at random and
is used to duplicate the data from p1. As such, a second client can
request the same block using different positions. In the event that
a second client requests the same positions p1 and/or p2 while they
are locked, the server will inform the client of the lockout through
an error message. By running ACCESSRW again, the second client
can select new positions p′1 and p
′
2 to retrieve the requested block
and a duplicate-destination block. A detailed instantiation of this
procedure is presented in Fig 4.
A secondary benefit from supporting concurrency by design
is that it allows parallel access to the store. Because each store
access by CAOS functions only affects two positions at a time,
regular clients (and OCs) can instantiate multiple ACCESSRW (or
ACCESSOC) operations simultaneously for different blocks. This
increases access speeds when the data required is stored in multiple
blocks. It also affects the speed of the obfuscation process which
can be increased or decreased by adjusting the bandwidth available.
RW OC Store
READ (p1,p2)
lock
(p1,p2)
(p1,p2)
READ (p1,p2)
err : locked
READ (p′1,p′2)
lock
(p′1,p′2)
(p′1,p′2)
WRITE (p1,p2)
unlock
(p1,p2)WRITE(p′1,p′2)
unlock
(p′1,p′2)
Figure 4: Concurrent access in CAOS. Upon receiving a
READ(p1, p2) message the server locks requested positions p1
and p2. If receiving a second request for p1 and/or p2, from a
different client (e.g. the OC), the server will reply with an error. The
second client can restart the protocol and request a new pair (e.g.
p′1 and p
′
2). Positions are unlocked after the server processes the
WRIT E position message (e.g.WRIT E(p1, p2) orWRIT E(p′1, p′2)).
5 CONTENT AND ACCESS-PATTERN
PRIVACY FOR CAOS AND PROTOCOL
CORRECTNESS
In this section we give a formal definition of content privacy and
pattern access privacy for CAOS-like protocols. Next we analyse
the privacy offered by our proposal CAOS. Finally, we present
our invariants which ensure that our asynchronous concurrency
protocol does not result in unintentional data loss.
5.1 Game-based privacy for CAOS
We start with the following definition.
Definition 5.1. The access-pattern induced by the i-th run of the
ACCESSRW or ACCESSOC algorithms of a CAOS-like protocol O
is the tuple APi = (pr1 , . . . ,prl ,pw1 , . . . ,pwm ), consisting of the l
positions read by the server and the m positions written by the
server. The access-pattern induced by a sequence of queries is the
combination of the patterns induced by the individual queries.
AttackerModel. When the algorithmsACCESSRW andACCESSOC
are run, the adversary learns the access-pattern induced by those
queries. The attacker is given access to the setup algorithms INIT.STORE
and INIT.OC, and thus knows the initial layout of the store and OC
buffer.
Using the access-pattern definition above we define the security
of a generic CAOS-like construction O against a multiple query
attacker in the following.
Definition 5.2 (data and access-pattern privacy). CAOS data and
access-pattern privacy is defined through a multiple query security
experiment as follows (see also Fig 5). Let O = (KGen, INIT.STORE,
INIT.OC,ACCESSRW,ACCESSOC) be a CAOS-like protocol over
Expbm,A (O)
k
R←− KGen(1λ )
st0 ← (INIT.STORE, INIT.OC)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , q } do
for i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1} do
sti ← ACCESSOC(S , k )
endfor
(aux j , B0, j , B1, j , op0, j , op1, j , d0, j , d1, j ) ← A1, j (st0, . . . , str−1)
str , j ← ACCESSRW(Bb , j , opb , j , db , j , S , k )
endfor
b′ ← A2(aux1, . . . , auxq , str ,1, . . . , str ,q )
return b′
Figure 5:CAOSdata and access-pattern privacy game for amultiple
query adversary A = (A1,1, . . . , A1,q , A2).
an (n,N ) store S , λ a security parameter, r be number of rounds
the OC is run, and b ∈ {0, 1}. LetA = (A1,1, . . . ,A1,q ,A2) be a q-
query adversary. Let DB be a database. We consider Expbm,A (O), a
probabilistic experiment defined in terms of a game played between
an adversary A and a challenger C, consisting of:
(1) Setup. C runs KGen(1λ) to create a symmetric key k , and runs
(INIT.STORE, INIT.OC) to initialize the store and the OC’s in-
ternal buffer.
(2) Query. During each query j:
(a) Obfuscation. C runs the obfuscation algorithm ACCESSOC(S,
k), r times.
(b) Challenge.A1 chooses two block id’s, B0 and B1, two operati-
ons op0 and op1, and two data contents d0,d1 to be written if
any of op0 or op1 is a write operation. C runs ACCESSRW(Bb ,
opb ,db , S,k).
(3) Guess. A2 computes a guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1}, winning the game if
b ′ = b. The output of the experiment is b ′.
The advantage of a multiple query adversary A = (A1,1, . . . ,
A1,q ,A2) against the data and access-pattern privacy of a CAOS-
like protocol O is defined as:Pr[Exp0m,A (O) = 1] − Pr[Exp1m,A (O) = 1] .
Let us argue that the security experiment above captures both
content and access-pattern privacy for CAOS-like protocols. Data
privacy against the server is captured by letting the adversary
choose two equal-sized data blocks B0 and B1 (indexed by their
block id’s) before every ACCESSRW query. The read-write (read-
only) client will call ACCESSRW on data block Bb , where b ∈ {0, 1}
is unknown to the adversary. On the other hand, access-pattern
privacy against the server is captured by an adversarial choosing
of the operation to be performed, i.e. either op0 or op1, depending
on the value of b that is unknown to the adversary. During the
experiment, the adversary A has full knowledge of the instructi-
ons run and the changes occurred in the store when the read-only
(read-write) and obfuscation clients will be calling the algorithms
ACCESSRW,ACCESSOC as defined by the corresponding proto-
col O. The attacker’s advantage as defined above measures how
well the adversary does in gaining knowledge on b by querying
ACCESSRW,ACCESSOC a number j of times. We obtain the follo-
wing result:
Theorem 5.3. CAOS has content and access-pattern privacy, i.e.
the advantage of any multiple query adversary against the privacy
of O is negligible in the security parameter λ and the number of OC
rounds r .
See Appendix C for a proof.
5.2 Invariants in CAOS
Different clients hold different position maps, and therefore it is
possible that a client’s position map will be out of date. Being a
little bit out of date is not a problem: if a client seeks a block at a
position and finds a different block there, the client can detect that,
and seek the block at another position. However, we need to ensure
that a client will always eventually find the block. We therefore
prove the following invariant: for every client and every block, the
client has a valid position for the block in its map. See Appendix D
for a proof.
6 PERFORMANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION
The security of CAOS derives from the fact that the obfuscation
client (OC) runs in between the accesses made by the regular clients.
Intuitively, the more runs of OC, the more secure the system. In this
section, we derive the expected number of rounds of OC needed to
get perfect security (i.e. a situation in which the adversary has no
knowledge of what block is in what position). In our algorithm, OC
processes two positions per round. For simplicity, in this section,
we consider an OC that processes a single position per round. In-
tuitively, the performance of the two-round OC is no worse than a
one-round OC.
Theorem 6.1. The expected number of rounds of OC needed to
obtain perfect privacy for a (n,N ) store is at most 2+s+(n−s) log(n−
s) + N logN , where s is the OC’s buffer size.
Since N is much greater than n and s , this is dominated by
N logN . Intuitively, perfect privacy cannot be achieved with less
than N rounds, since every store position needs to be updated. See
Appendix B for a proof.
6.1 Performance
We next report on the performance of our instantiation of CAOS in
terms of storage and bandwidth, and present measured data from a
non-optimized implementation of our protocol [1] for a 64GB store
size.
Read-write client. Client storage in CAOS is limited to the client map
and the two blocks from the store retrieved by the ACCESSRW.
These, however, are only stored only for the duration of the method
run.
Our bandwidth requirements are constant: two blocks are acces-
sed for each requested data block from the store. Because the storage
server only locks the positions requested for the duration of a client
access, multiple blocks can be requested simultaneously in a parallel
manner.
Obfuscation client. The OC accesses the store the same way the RW
client does, hence the bandwidth requirements per block are the
same. The OC requires additional storage than the read-write client
in the form of a local buffer which is needed for the obfuscation
process. In Appendix B we show how to compute r1 the number of
rounds required to obtain secure output from the OC for any given
buffer size s . We note that the rate given by Eq. 1, Appendix B is
valid for a single positions processed per round. Given that the OC
behaves identical to the read-write client implies that the rate is in
fact doubled.
Similarly, one can also compute an upper bound on the number
of rounds needed to bring the store from a completely insecure
state (i.e. adversary knows the contents of each position) to a secure
state using Eq. 2, Appendix B.
Storage server. In order for our CAOS protocol to guarantee that
blocks can be shuffled between positions it is required that each
block is stored redundantly on a number of positions equal to the
number of clients using CAOS. However, if the additional space is
not available when the store is initialised, our protocol will auto-
matically adjust itself allowing the size of the store to be increased
gradually.
Implementation. We have implemented CAOS in C++ using the
OpenSSL-1.0.2.k for the encryption operations (concretely we use
AES-128 in CBC mode) and Protocol Buffers2 for network message
serialisation. Our setup consists of a server which exposes a block-
store API with direct access to disk. The server’s API is addressable
through positions. In addition to the server we implemented a RW
client and an OC client which are able to run ACCESSRW and
ACCESSOC respectively.
On an Intel i5-3570 CPU at 3.40GHz running ArchLinux we have
instantiated a secure store of 64GB with a redundancy factor C = 2
(i.e. every block is stored on two positions resulting in N = 2n).
We measured the read/write speed to the store, client storage and
server storage. Our results are presented in Table 1.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed Concurrent-Access Obfuscated
Store (CAOS), a cloud storage solution that is able to provide access-
pattern obfuscation. We have presented our concurrent access pro-
tocol that allowsmultiple read-only clients to simultaneously access
a CAOS store. We have proved that the concurrent access does not
result in data loss. We have also proven the security of our protocol
for any buffer size s used by the obfuscation client given a sufficient
numbers of rounds r . Finally, we have shown that security provided
by the CAOS protocol is proportional to the resources provisioned
for access-pattern obfuscation, namely the buffer size s and the
number of rounds r . To our knowledge, there is no existing work
that uses an obfuscation client to hide access patterns. However
several works have been influential in the development of CAOS,
and we list them in Appendix ??.
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A CAOS USE-CASE EXAMPLE
Alice wishes to move her 1TB encrypted email store to the cloud,
for easy access from her three devices: a work computer, a lap-
top and a mobile device. She also requires that her devices have
simultaneously access and access-pattern protection.
One option for Alice is to use an ORAM scheme [10, 16, 22] as
they provide both data encryption and access pattern security with
O(logN ) efficiency. With ORAM, Alice can expect to download and
upload an average of about 468KB of data3 for each 30KB email
message she wants to access.
To enable simultaneous access for her devices she can use a
proxy-based ORAM scheme [17, 20]. This would allow Alice’s de-
vices to use less bandwidth, because they would interact with the
proxy, however, the bandwidth between the proxy and the store
will remain similar (i.e. [20] requires 30MB/s to provide 1MB/s
access to the store, [17] requires a transfer of 256KB to access a 4KB
store block). Unfortunately, the high bandwidth and computational
requirements might force Alice to place the proxy in the cloud, an
option she does not like because then access patterns to the proxy
would leak information.
An alternative option for Alice would be to use CAOS. In CAOS
her devices would have simultaneous and direct access to the store.
Access-pattern obfuscation would be done by OCs which can be
placed either in the cloud or on the premises because they access the
store independently from her devices. However, access operations
in CAOS randomize the store, and Alice’s devices and OCs would
require some form of synchronisation between them to be able to
access it.
One naïve CAOS implementation which solves the synchroni-
sation problem is to separate a part of the store, share it between
devices and OCs, and use it to log the changes. During each access,
clients would be able to process the log and update their access
information (i.e. maps). However, if Alice were to stop using any
one of her 3 device for just a month, upon resuming use, that device
will have to process around 46MB worth of log entries4 only to
access a 30KB index, as the log grows linearly with the number of
3For a 1TB ORAM store which uses 4KB blocks and 4 blocks per bucket, the size of
transferred data is between 104KB and 832KB, depending on how the data is laid out
in the server’s memory and the ORAM scheme used.
4This number assumes that a log entry is 1KB, and that the remaining 2 devices will
only access a 30KB email index that uses 8 blocks, 6 times per hour, 16 hours per day for
30 days. The number does not account for any OCs doing access-pattern obfuscation,
in which case the number would be much higher.
U
V
mv1
mv2s
s − n
(a) OBS shuffle
U
V
mv′′1
mv′′2
(b) OBS′′ shuffle
Figure 6: The OBS shuffle (a) consists of two moves: mv1, which
moves a random card from partition U into a random location of
partition V; and mv2, which moves a random card from partition
V into the vacated place of partition U. In the OBS′′ (b) shufflemv ′′1
moves the top card in U into a random location of V; andmv ′′2 which
moves the top card in V into the bottom place of U.
accesses. Security would also be affected. At the very least the vari-
able network traffic required to retrieve the log reveals the period
when the device was offline.
B PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the following we give a proof for Theorem 6.1.
Proof. The number of rounds of OC needed is the sum of:
(1) The number r1 of rounds needed for the buffer contents to
be randomised (this is needed only the first time OC is run,
when the adversary knows the contents of the buffer);
(2) The number r2 of rounds needed for every position in the
store to have been overwritten by the buffer.
To calculate r1, consider an array of size n containing all the blocks.
Let U be the sub-array containing the first s blocks of the array
(these represent the contents of the OC buffer), andV the remaining
n − s blocks (representing those that are not in the buffer). In each
round of OC, a random block B from U is selected and moved to
V (this corresponds to evicting a block from the buffer), while a
random block from V is moved to the former place of B in U . We
seek the expected number r1 of runs which completely randomises
the array.
This situation is similar to shuffling a deck of n cards, using
a "top-to-random" shuffle, a well studied method [2, 3, 11]. In a
top-to-random shuffle one repeatedly takes the top card of the deck
and inserts it into a random position. In the following we will argue
that our shuffle, OBS (Fig 6a), is no worse than a "top-to-random"
shuffle.
In OBS the deck is partitioned intoU and V . It takes a random
card fromU and inserts it randomly in V , and takes a random card
of V and inserts it into the place vacated in U . Intuitively, this is
no worse than the shuffle OBS′ which simply takes a random card
inU and inserts it in V , and takes the top card in V and inserts it
at the bottom of U . Now consider the shuffle OBS′′ (Fig 6b) which
is like OBS′ but instead of taking a random card inU , we take the
top card inU . Again, OBS′ is no worse than OBS′′, and therefore
OBS is no worse that OBS′′.
To calculate the expected number of rounds of OBS′′ needed,
we proceed similarly to [2]. Consider the bottom card of the deck.
One has to wait on average n − s rounds before a card is inserted
below it. Then one has to wait (n − s)/2 more rounds before a card
is again inserted below the original bottom card. Continuing in this
way, the number of rounds needed for the original bottom to get to
the U/V threshold is
(n − s) + n − s2 +
n − s
3 + · · · +
n − s
n − s ≤ 1 + (n − s) log(n − s).
A further s rounds are needed for the original bottom to progress
from the U/V threshold to the top of the deck. Thus, the total number
of rounds is (n − s) log(n − s)+ s . Since OBS is no worse than OBS′′,
we have
r1 ≤ 1 + (n − s) log(n − s) + s . (1)
Calculation of r2 is similar. The first of the N positions is over-
written in one round. For the second position to be overwritten, we
have to wait N /(N − 1) rounds; this is a bit longer, because we may
accidentally overwrite the first one again. The ith position requires
us to wait N /(N − i) rounds. Thus, all the positions are overwritten
after an expected
r2 = 1 +
N
N − 1 + · · · + N ≤ 1 + N logN (2)
rounds. Therefore, r1 + r2 ≤ 2+ (n − s) log(n − s)+ s +N logN . 
C ANALYSIS OF CAOS CONTENT AND
ACCESS-PATTERN PRIVACY
Our aim now is to analyze privacy offered by CAOS against a
multiple query adversary. To this end, we need to make use of two
lemmas, starting with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let S be the (n,N )CAOS-like store withN = {p0, . . . ,pN−1}
positions. Suppose that our ACCESSOC is run r times. Let no(pi ) be
the event that the position pi was not overwritten during the r rounds.
The probability that, after r runs of the ACCESSOC method, at le-
ast one of the N positions has not been overwritten (i.e. at least one
position survived being overwritten) is:
pN ,r = Pr
[
no(p0) ∨ . . . ∨ no(pN−1)
]
=
=
N∑
i=1
(−1)i+1 ·
(
N
i
)
·
(
N − i
N
)r (3)
In order to increase its advantage in the privacy game, the ad-
versary uses as leverage its knowledge of what blocks are in which
positions in the store, and what blocks are in the OC buffer. As
OC runs, the adversary might try to track the movement of blocks.
We can model the adversary’s knowledge of what is inside the OC
buffer as a probability distribution.
Suppose the buffer size is s . The OC buffer contains at most
one occurrence of a given block id. Our goal in the following is to
describe the evolution of the adversary’s knowledge as a probability
distribution. We start by recalling that, at each step, OC selects a
block to be added to the buffer. If the selected block id is already in
the buffer, then the set of block ids in the buffer is not changed. But
if the selected block is not currently in the buffer, then one of the
buffer’s slots is chosen (with uniform probability) and the block id
in that slot is evicted, in order to add the selected one.
Therefore, the buffer contents will be X after such a step if:
(1) The buffer contents were already X , and an element in X
was selected; or
(2) For some x ∈ X and e < X , the buffer contents was (X −
{x}) ∪ {e}, and x got selected for adding to the buffer, and e
was chosen for eviction from the buffer and gets put back in
the store where x had been.
We view this as a system of states and transitions. A state is the
pair (X , sel), where X is a set of block ids, and sel is a function from
block ids to reals that abstracts the store. The value sel(x) is the
probability that a position in the store chosen uniformly at random
contains block id x . Since x must occur at least once in the store,
and since every other block must also occur at least once, x appears
at least once and at most N − n + 1 times. Therefore, for any x , the
value sel(x) is in the set { 1N , 2N , . . . , N−n+1N }.
There are two kinds of transition, corresponding to the two
points above:
(1) For each x ∈ X : (X , sel) can transition to (X , sel), with pro-
bability sel(x).
(2) For each x ∈ X and e < X :
((X −{x})∪{e}), sel
[ x 7→sel(x )+ 1N
e 7→sel(e)− 1N
]
) can transition to (X , sel),
with probability sel(x)× 1s . (Here, the notation sel[x 7→ expr ]
means the function sel but with x mapping to expr . The
factor 1s in the transition probability is the probability that e
is evicted.)
This system is easily seen to be a Markov chain with eigenvalues
1 = |λ1 | > |λ2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |λn |. Moreover, this Markov chain describes
a random walk in a strongly connected Eulerian digraph in which
nodes represent the possible states (X , sel) and the edges represent
the transitions between them.
Let us write inbj (X ) for the probability that, after the jth run, the
set of block ids present in the buffer isX . We can state the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. Let outj (B) be the probability that the block coming out
of an OCwith buffer size s at the j-th step is the block B. For all j, j ′ > r
and initial distributions inb0, the probability |outj (B) − outj′(B)| is
at most (
n − 1
s − 1
)
·C · |λ2 |r
for some constant C and λ2 < 1, and is therefore negligible in r .
Proof. Let P be the transition matrix for this Markov chain.
Then P is stochastic, irreducible and aperiodic. Let πj be the pro-
bability distribution after j steps. Then πj = π0 · P j . Let λ1 and
λ2 be the largest and second-largest eigenvalues of P . Overwhel-
mingly likely, the enginvalues are all distinct. Since P is stochastic,
λ1 = 1 and |λ2 | < 1. Applying the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
similarly to Backaker [4, Theorem 3 and Example 1], we have
Pr = P∞ + O(|λ2 |r ), and therefore πj − πj′ = π0 · C ′ |λ2 |r for
j, j ′ > r for some constant C ′.
Let π (X , sel) be the probability that the state is (X , sel) in the pro-
bability distribution π . Then inbj (X ) = ∑sel πj (X , sel). Letmj , j′ =
maxX (|inbj (X ) − inbj′(X )|), where X ranges over sets of block ids
of size s . Then, for j, j ′ > r ,
mj , j′ = maxX (∑sel |πj (X , sel) − πj′(X , sel)|)
= maxX (∑sel(π0(X , sel) ·C ′ |λ2 |r ))
= C ′ |λ2 |r ·maxX (∑sel π0(X , sel)).
Notice that outj (B) = ∑X |B∈X inbj (X ). Therefore,
|outj (B) − outj′(B)| =
∑
X |B∈X
|inbj (X ) − inbj′(X )|
≤
(
n − 1
s − 1
)
·mj , j′
≤
(
n − 1
s − 1
)
·C · |λ2 |r
where C = C ′ ·maxX (∑sel π0(X , sel)). 
Theorem C.1. CAOS has content and access-pattern privacy, i.e.
the advantage of any multiple query adversary against the privacy
of CAOS is negligible in the security parameter λ and the number of
OC rounds r .
Proof. We bound the distinguishing advantage of any CAOS
adversary through the following sequence of “game hops”.
Game 1. This is the legitimate Exp0m,A (O) experiment. In parti-
cular, in the j-th challenge query C returns ACCESSRW(B0, j ,op0, j ,
d0, j , S,k), for j = 1, . . . ,q.
We define the following series of experiments for j = 1, . . . ,q.
Game 2, j . Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,q} be fixed. In this experiment, the que-
ries i = 1, . . . , j are answeredwithACCESSRW(B0,i ,op0,i ,d1,i , S,k),
namely by performing operation op0,i on block B0,i with data d1,i
(instead of data d0,i ). The remaining queries until the q-th query
are responded normally, i.e. with ACCESSRW(B0,i ,op0,i ,d0,i , S,k)
for i = j + 1, . . . ,q.
Let us call this modified experiment Exp2, jm,A (O). One can easily
see that Pr[Exp2,j−1m,A (O) = 1] − Pr[Exp2,jm,A (O) = 1] 
for j = 1, . . . ,q is upper-bounded by the distinguishing advantage
against the semantic security of the encryption scheme, which is
negligible [5]. Trivially Exp2,0m,A (O) = Exp0m,A (O).
Next, for j = 1, . . . ,q we define a new sequence of experiments.
Game 3, j. Fix j. In this experiment, the queries i = 1, . . . , j are
answered with ACCESSRW(B1,i ,op0,i ,d1,i , S,k), i.e. by running
operation op0,i on block B1,i with data d1,i (instead of running it
on block B0,i ). The remaining queries until the q-th query remain
unchanged, i.e. they return ACCESSRW(B0,i ,op0,i ,d1,i , S,k) for
i = j + 1, . . . ,q. Let us call resulting experiment Exp3, jm,A (O).
We proceed to upper bound the probability that an adversary
has in distinguishing access to two different blocks B2, j and B1, j in
experiment Exp3, jm,A (O).
Consider the r runs of OC. Let r1 = r/2; we will distinguish
between the first set of r1 runs, and the remaining r − r1 runs. Now
we distinguish between two situations that arise after the runs:
State A The adversary has observed that all the positions in the
store got overwritten by a block id coming out of OC during
the second set of r − r1 runs.
State B The adversary has observed that not all the positions got
overwritten; that is, at least one position survived being
overwritten during the second set of r − r1 runs.
When a store position is overwritten at step j by a block coming
from OC, the adversary’s probability distribution of what block is in
that store position is outj (·). If State A is observed, then the advers-
ary’s probability of distinguishing the block read in ACCESSRW is
at most
max
B,i ,i′
|Pr
[
Si contains B
]
− Pr
[
Si′ contains B
]
|
which is at mostmax r1< j , j′<r
B
|outj (B)−outj′(B)|. By Lemma 2, this
value is at most
(n−1
s−1
) · Sr .
The probability that state B is observed is pN ,r1 (this notation is
defined in Lemma 1).
The probability of distinguishing is the probability of arriving in
state A times the probability of distinguishing in state A, plus the
probability of arriving in state B times the probability of distinguis-
hing in state B. This is at most:
(1 − pN ,r ) ×
(
n − 1
s − 1
)
· Sr + pN ,r × 1 (4)
Since both Sr and pN ,r are negligible in r , the probability and
therefore the advantage of the adversary is negligible in r .
Let us define the last series of game hops, again for j = 1, . . . ,q.
Game 4, j. In this experiment, the queries i = 1, . . . , j are ans-
wered with ACCESSRW(B1,i ,op1,i ,d1,i , S,k), i.e. by running ope-
ration op1,i on block B1,i with data d1,i (instead of running ope-
ration op0,i ). The remaining queries until the q-th query remain
unchanged, i.e. they return ACCESSRW(B1,i ,op0,i ,d1,i , S,k) for
i = j + 1, . . . ,q. Let us call resulting experiment Exp4, jm,A (O). Actu-
ally, it holds that
Pr
[
Exp4,j−1m,A (O) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exp4,jm,A (O) = 1
]
by construction. This is because ACCESSRW performs the same
(read position followed by write position) both for read and write
operations. It is easy to see that Exp4,qm,A (O) = Exp1m,A (O).
Finally, by adding the probabilities obtained in each game hop,
the statement of the theorem follows. 
D INVARIANTS
We prove the following invariant: for every client and every block,
the client has a valid position for the block in its map (INV-2 below).
In the following we will use block[p] notation to denote the block
contained at position p in the server store, andmapC[B] to denote
the entry for block id B in the map of client C.
We start with a simpler invariant, which is a useful lemma.
INV-1. The variable block[p].cns on the server is at most equal
to the number of clients that know that that block is at position p.
More precisely: for all positions p,
block[p].cns ={C ∈ Clients | p ∈mapC[block[p].bid].psns
∧mapC[block[p].bid].ts = block[p].ts
 (5)
The code maintains this invariant by linking any change to the
local map with an operation on the block[p].cns value. These chan-
ges happen when the contents of the block is updated or deleted
(by marking the block as free). The SyncPositons operation (see
Algorithm 2) updates a client’s local map to reflect changes per-
formed by other clients and frees old data. The WriteBlock and
DuplicateBlock set the block[p].cns value to 1 in order to trigger
map changes in other clients.
As a corollary, we have the following:
INV-1′. When block[p].cns has the maxim value (|Clients |), then
every client’s local map contains the latest information about posi-
tion p. More precisely, for each p:
block[p].cns = |Clients | ⇒
∀C ∈ clients, p ∈mapC[block[p].bid].psns ∧
∧ mapC[block[p].bid].ts = block[p].ts (6)
INV-2. For each block, a valid position is always known to all
CAOS clients.
More precisely, for any block id B, there is a position p such that
block[p].bid = B ∧ p ∈
⋂
C∈Clients
mapC[B].psns
Before we prove this invariant, we provide some intuition. To
maintain INV-2, we use themap[B].vf set stored in the client’s map.
This set tracks which are the positions p of a block that a client
has observed to have a maximum value for block[p].cns . In order
to prevent data loss, we require that (1) at any time each client can
only reassign a single position, and (2) that at least one position
still remains if all the clients decide to reassign one position.
The second part of the requirement (2) is easily achieved by
checking that the size ofmap[B].vf is bigger than the number of
clients. We address the first requirement (1) by requiring each client
mark themap[B].vf set as empty whenever they reassign a position
from it. This will prevent the client to reassign any consolidated
positions until it re-learns their location.
Proof. We prove it for the case that there are two clients, say
C and D; as will be seen, the proof generalises intuitively to more
clients. Suppose INV-2 is not an invariant; then there is a transition
from a state st3 in which INV-2 holds for a block id B, to a state st4
in which it does not hold for B. Suppose client C reallocates the
crucial position p in st3 which is lost in st4. Since st3 satisfies INV-2,
in st3 p ∈mapC[B].psns and p ∈mapD [B].psns , and since st4 does
not satisfy INV-2, in st4 mapC[B].psns ∩mapD [B].psns = ∅. Using
Algorithms 2 and 5, we see that the transition for C from st3 to st4
required |mapC[B].vf| > 2 in st3, so suppose that mapC[B].vf ⊇
{p,q, r } in st3. Since vf ⊆ psns (Algorithms 2 and 5), we have
{p,q, r } ⊆ mapC[B].psns in st3.
Let st0 be the state immediately after the previous reallocation
by C. ThenmapC[B].vf = ∅ in st0. Since q, r ∈ mapC[B].vf in st3,
there was a state between st0 and st3 in which q.cns = 2, and one
in which r .cns = 2. Let st1 be the most recent of those states. Either
q or r was reallocated between st1 and st3, and by definition of st0,
that reallocation was done by D. Consider the most recent reallo-
cation by D done before st3, say in a state st2. Now we have states
st0, st1, st2, st3, st4 in temporal order. Based on Agorithms 2 and 5,
|mapC[B].vf| > 2 in st2, so saymapD [B].vf ⊇ {t1, t2, t3}. Then, in
st2 we have: block[t1].cns = block[t2].cns = block[t3].cns = 2, and
by INV-1′, {t1, t2, t3} ⊆ mapC[B].psns ∩mapD [B].psns . In st3,D’s
transition has removed one element from mapD [B].psns , and in
st4, C’s transition has removed one element frommapC[B].psns .
Therefore, in st4,mapC[B].psns∩mapD [B].psns is non-empty, con-
tradicting our hypothesis. 
E ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 4: Write a block to the store.
Input: block id, block, data
Output: block, status
1 function PrepareWrite (bid, block, data)
2 if (block .bid = bid or block .bid = f r ee) then
3 block .bid ← bid ;
4 block .data ← data;
5 block .cns ← 1;
6 block .ts ← current_t ime ;
7 status ← block .data;
8 else
9 status ← null ;
10 return (block , status);
Algorithm 5: Duplicate a store block to a new position.
Input: source block, destination block, destination position
Output: destination block, client map
1 function DuplicateBlock (sblock, dblock, p,mapc )
2 if ((dblock .cns = |clients | and
|mapc [dblock .bid ].v f | > |clients |) or
3 (dblock .cns = 1 and |mapc [dblock .bid ].psns | > 1))
4 then
5 dblock .bid ← sblock .bid ;
6 dblock .data ← sblock .data;
7 dblock .ts ← sblock .ts ;
8 dblock .cns ← 1;
9 clear mapc [dblock .bid ].v f ;
10 move p frommapc [dblock .bid ].psns to
mapc [sblock .bid ].psns ;
11 return (dblock ,mapc );
Algorithm 6: Update the local buffer data structure.
Input: block, position, buffer, obfuscation client map
Output: block, buffer
1 function UpdateBuffer(blk , p , buffer ,mapoc )
2 if (buffer not f ull ) then
3 add blk to buffer ;
4 if (buffer is f ull ) then
5 buf _blk R←− buffer ;
6 (blk ,mapoc ) ←
DuplicateBlock (buf _blk , blk , p,mapoc );
7 if (buf _blk = blk ) then
8 remove buf _blk from buffer ;
9 return (blk,buffer);
